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NOTE
ATTORNEY DISQUALIFICATION AND
ACCESS TO WORK PRODUCT:
TOWARD A PRINCIPLED RULE*
INTRODUCTION

Under the prevailing rule, courts will disqualify counsel on
conflict of interest grounds if there exists: (1) former representation of a party to the present lawsuit, (2) present representation of
a party adverse to the former client, and (3) a substantial relationship between the subject matter of the former representation and
the issues of the present lawsuit.' In First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust
v. First Wisconsin Corp.,2 the Seventh Circuit reversed en banc a
panel decision that extended this rule to deny substitute counsel
access to disqualified counsel's work product.3 The panel had rea* As this Note went to press, the Seventh Circuit reversed First Wis. Mortgage Trust v.
First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978), in an en banc rehearing. See First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., No. 77-1786 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1978). The en banc decision anticipates the conclusions in Part II of this Note.
ISee Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570 (2d Cir. 1973); Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 924 (2d
Cir. 1954); First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 422 F. Supp. 493, 496 (E.D. Wis.
1976) (disqualification order), appeal dismissed, No. 77-1786 (7th Cir. Jan. 30, 1977); Marketti v. Fitzsimmons, 373 F. Supp. 637, 639 (W.D. Wis. 1974); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown,
305 F. Supp. 371, 394-95 (S.D. Tex. 1969); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interests: Representation of Interest Adverse to that of Former Client, 55 B.U. L. REv. 61, 78 (1975); Note, Ethical
ConsiderationsWhen an Attorney Opposes A Former Client: The Need for a Realistic Application of
Canon Nine, 52 CUI.-KENT L. REv. 525, 525 (1975). Many courts and commentators refer to
this rule as the "substantial relationship" test for attorney disqualification. See, e.g., Emle
Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d at 570; Note, supra, 52 CHr.-KENT L. REv. at 525.
No. 77-1786 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1978) (rehearing en banc). The district court disqualified defendants' counsel in 1976. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 422 F.
Supp. 493 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (disqualification order), appeal dismissed, No. 77-1786 (7th Cir.
Jan. 30, 1977). The district court subsequently denied substitute counsel's motion for authorization to request access to disqualified counsel's work product. First Wis. Mortgage
Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 74 F.R.D. 625 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (work product order). A threejudge panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed (First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp.,
571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978)), but was reversed upon rehearing en banc.
3 The Supreme Court had defined "work product" to include, inter alia, a lawyer's
written legal documents and his "mental impressions." See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 511 (1947). This Note uses the term work product to refer only to written legal
documents. The work product sought in First Wisconsin consisted of a routine written
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soned that "allowing [substitute counsel] to have access to the legal
work of disqualified counsel negates the effect of the disqualification order. '4 A party need not prove that his former attorney actually received confidences or secrets in order to prevail on a motion
to disqualify under the three-part rule. 5 The Seventh Circuit panel
erroneously assumed that the three-part rule therefore creates an
irrebuttable presumption that counsel received both confidences
and secrets of his former client when the subject matter of the
former representation and the issues of the subsequent adverse
representation are substantially related.6 Relying on this assumption, the panel concluded that substitute counsel can never use
disqualified counsel's work product, even if it contains neither confidences nor secrets. 7 On rehearing, six of nine judges of the
Seventh Circuit recognized that attorney disqualification does not
automatically require denying access to the disqualified attorney's
work product.
This Note addresses the problems of attorney disqualification 8
analysis of certain loan files. 571 F.2d at 400 (dissenting opinion, Pell, J.). For further
discussion of the term work product and the confusion it may have caused in First Wisconsin, see note 77 infra.
4 571 F.2d at 398. "If an attorney's subsequent adverse representation in the form of
his work product is not barred from use by substitute counsel, then there is little or no
point in the initial disqualification." First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 74
F.R.D. at 627 (work product order), cited in First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp.,
571 F.2d at 396.
1 See note I supra.
6 571 F.2d at 397. The panel posited that "where a lawyer is disqualified for prior
representation of a current adversary, it is unnecessary to establish that the lawyer actually
possessed confidential information of the former client; such possession is presumed." Id.
(citing Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976)). Concluding
that "no reason [exists] to change this presumption when interpreting the effects of attorney
disqualification" (id. (emphasis in original)), the Seventh Circuit panel held that disqualification automatically precludes access to disqualified counsel's work product (id. at 398-99).
Because Schloetter did not involve former simultaneous representation, it does not support
an irrebuttable presumption that counsel received confidences as well as secrets during his
prior representation of the party moving to disqualify. See also notes 30-46 and accompanying text infra.
Beyond the policy of protecting former client confidences and secrets, the panel cited
only the goal of avoiding the appearance of impropriety as a rationale for disqualification
(571 F.2d at 396-97) and denial of access to work product (id. at 397). The court, however,
did not discuss precisely why it would appear improper to permit substitute counsel to use
work product that concededly contained no confidences or secrets of disqualified counsel's
former client. For a discussion of appearance of impropriety, see notes 59-64 & 74-76 and
accompanying text infra.
571 F.2d at 397-99. For further discussion see note 6 supra.
Disqualification in this Note refers to a court order directing an attorney to withdraw
from a case. The court order is ordinarily granted in response to an opposing party's
motion. See, e.g., Marketti v. Fitzsimmons, 373 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Wis. 1974); T.C.
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and access to the disqualified attorney's work product in the context of former simultaneous representation. 9 Multiple parties, notably joint venturers, often employ common counsel. Subsequent
disputes between the clients, however, may prompt one or more of
them to seek independent representation. The difficulties arise
when, in ensuing litigation, those former clients move to disqualify
their former counsel from appearing against them.
Former simultaneous representation complicates application of
the three-part disqualification rule because a major rationale for
disqualification-protection of privileged communications--does
not apply. Communications between multiple clients and their
common attorney are not privileged as between the multiple
clients. 10 Other rationales-preventing misuse of client secrets,"
avoiding the appearance of impropriety, 12 and enforcing fiduciary
duties13--do support disqualification in some, but not all cases of
former simultaneous representation. Only the need to protect
client secrets, however, can justify denying access to work product. 4 Moreover, even this rationale carries little weight because
courts can examine work product in camera. Regrettably, recent
decisions obscure the rationales for attorney disqualification by
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The court
may also issue the order on its own initiative. See Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132 (W.D.
Wash. 1946). Disqualification prevents employment in any capacity in the same case. See
T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. at 270; Steeley v. State, 17
Okla. Crim. 252, 262, 187 P. 821, 824 (1920). This Note deals only with disqualification in
civil cases. Policies peculiar to criminal law give rise to very different grounds for disqualification of prosecutors or criminal defense counsel. See R. WisE, LEGAL ETHIcs 261-66
(1970).
9 Conflict of interest issues arising at the time counsel attempts to represent multiple
clients are beyond the purview of this Note. For collections of cases dealing with such
conflict of interest problems, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 715 (1970) (disqualification of attorneys in civil cases); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 389 (1969) (liability of attorneys for malpractice);
Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 835 (1968) (conflicts of interest exposing attorneys to disciplinary
action); Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 759 (1961) (disqualification of attorneys from representing
trustees or receivers in bankruptcy).
10See Petty v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 2d 20, 29, 253 P.2d 28, 33 (1953); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Engels, 41 Misc. 2d 49, 51, 244 N.Y.S.2d 983, 986 (1963); C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 91, at 187-88 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2312 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). "The reason assigned for the
rule is that, as between the [multiple] clients, communications made for the mutual benefit
of all lack the element of confidentiality which is the basis of privileged communications."
81 AM. JUR. 2d Witnesses § 190, at 225-26 (1976).
1 See text accompanying notes 37-47 & 77-83 infra.
:2 See text accompanying notes 59-64 & 75-76 infra.
3See text accompanying notes 48-58 & 75-76 infra.
14 See text accompanying notes 75-83 infra.
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mechanically applying the three-part rule. 1 5 The First Wisconsin
panel's failure to recognize disqualification and access to work
product as analytically separate issues illustrates the danger of
mechanical application. This Note examines the cases and rationales underlying the three-part disqualification rule and concludes that neither justifies extending the rule to deny substitute
counsel access to work product as an automatic consequence of
attorney disqualification.

THE THREE-PART DISQUALIFICATION RULE:

A

STANDARD FOR ALL SITUATONS?

In both its disqualification and work product decisions, the
trial court in First Wisconsin relied extensively upon E.F. Hutton &
Co. v. Brown,' 6 which first applied the three-part test to former
simultaneous representation. In Hutton, the plaintiff corporation
brought an action for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty
against Brown, its former vice-president. The court disqualified the
plaintiff's counsel because counsel had simultaneously represented
both parties in an earlier Securities and Exchange Commission investigation of matters substantially related to the present lawsuit.
Brown knew at the time of the investigation that his conversations
with counsel would be reported to corporate management.' 7 Thus,
counsel's subsequent representation of the corporation against
Brown could not violate the attorneys' duty to preserve privileged
communications.' 8 Nevertheless, the court concluded that "receipt
of confidential information is not a prerequisite to disqualification"' 9 under its three-part rule and ultimately disqualified counsel. This section sets forth the rationales for disqualification and
examines their judicial genesis and incorporation into the threepart Hutton rule.
Is
See

First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 422 F. Supp. at 496 (disqualifica-

tion order); Marketti v. Fitzsimmons, 373 F. Supp. 637, 639 (W.D. Wis. 1974); E.F. Hutton
& Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 394-95 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
16 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969), discussed in First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First
Wis. Corp., 422 F. Supp. at 496 (disqualification order); First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First
Wis. Corp., 74 F.R.D. at 626-27 (work product order). The Seventh Circuit panel approved
the district court's analysis without referring to that court's reliance on Hutton. See note 72
infra.
17 305 F. Supp. at 392.
I8 See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
19305 F. Supp. at 395.
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Preservationof the Former Client's Confidences and Secrets

1. Definitions
Hutton and other recent decisions 20 have loosely used the term
"confidential information," not recognizing that the term assumes
different meanings in different contexts. Courts and commentators
have used "confidential information" to refer to either privileged
communications alone or both privileged communications and se2
cretsY.
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility draws a distinction:
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorneyclient privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other
information gained in the professional relationship that the client
has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would
22
be embarassing or would likely be detrimental to the client.

Thus confidences are coterminous with information protected by
the attorney-client privilege. Confidences encompass only direct
communications between a client and his attorney 23 that are substantially related to the purpose for which the client sought legal
counsel. 24 Client secrets consist of sensitive information not protected by the privilege. Secrets, therefore, generally refer to information that the attorney obtains during the course of representation from sources other than the client.2 5 Analysis of the Hutton
21

See, e.g., First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, 397 (7th Cir.

1978), rev'd on rehearing en banc, No. 77-1786 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1978); Marketti v. Fitzsimmons, 373 F. Supp. 637, 639 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
21See, e.g., First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, 397 (7th Cir.
1978) (apparently both privileged communications and secrets), rev'd on rehearing en banc,
No. 77-1786 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1978); Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 711
(7th Cir. 1976) (privileged communications); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1975) (both privileged communications and
secrets); Note, supra note 1, 55 B.U. L. REV. at 73-74 (both privileged communications and
secrets); Note, Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to Former Clients,
64 YALE L.J. 917, 919 (1955) (privileged communications).
22 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1975).
23 The common law attorney-client privilege, codified in most jurisdictions, applies
only to direct communications between a client and his attorney. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 10, § 2292, at 554-57. The privilege law of the forum state governs in federal court
"with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision." FED. R. EvID. 501.
"4 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Modern Woodmen of America
v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1942); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2310, at
598-99.
25 Some direct communications between client and attorney that are not protected by
the attorney-client privilege may be secrets under the ABA Code of Professional Responsi-
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rule thus requires examination of two distinct rationales: protection
of confidences and protection of secrets.
2.

The Irrebuttable Presumption of Receipt of Confidences

Courts must not permit an attorney who received privileged
communications from a former client to represent an adverse party
in a matter related to those confidences. Proving actual receipt of
confidences, however, is often difficult.2 6 The courts have therefore created an irrebuttable presumption that counsel received
confidences from his former client if the former representation
and the present suit are substantially related.2 7 The irrebuttable
presumption not only ensures protection of client confidences but
also fosters public faith in the legal system by preventing even the
appearance of improper use of privileged communications.2 8 This,
bility. For example, if the client reveals to his attorney past misconduct or embarrassing
personal experiences that are unrelated to the purpose for which the client retained counsel, the communications may not be privileged. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2310, at
598-99. Nevertheless, the attorney must preserve the secret information. See ABA CODE OF
PROFSSIONNAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101(A) (1975), quoted in text accompanying note 22
supra. The Hutton disqualification rule, however, does not seek to protect secret communications unrelated to the subject matter of the former representation. See note 44 infra.
Under the three-part Hutton rule, a party may move to disqualify his former attorney from
representing others against him only if the subject matter of the former representation and
the issues involved in the current adverse representation are substantially related. See note
53 and accompanying text infra. Thus, the small category of client communications that are
secret but not privileged does not support attorney disqualification under the reasoning
behind the Hutton rule. In evaluating the Hutton rule, therefore, the term "secrets" designates sensitive information an attorney obtains from sources other than the client.
2' See Note, supra note 21, 64 YALE L.J. at 919.
2
See, e.g., Emle Indus. Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570 (2d Cir. 1973); Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 924 (2d
Cir. 1954); Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (dictum), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002
(1959); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). See Note, supra note 1, 52 CH.-KENT L. REv. at 528-30; Note, supra note
21, 64 YALE L.J. at 919.
28 "Underlying [the irrebuttable presumption] are strong reasons of policy: (1) to en-

courage and protect inviolate confidential communications between client and attorney;
and (2) to inspire and maintain public respect for and trust in the law and lawyers."
Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (dictum), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959). The
courts' desire to avoid the appearance of impropriety embodies two distinct policies: promotion of general public trust in the legal system, and ensurance of individual client trust
in lawyers in order to encourage uninhibited communication with counsel. The irrebuttable
presumption of receipt of confidences, however, does not further the goal of maintaining
general public faith in the legal system except in so far as it furthers the narrower policy of
encouraging individual clients to trust their attorneys. Only a rule that prohibited lawyers
from ever taking on representation against a former client would have broader tffect. The
prevailing three-part Hutton disqualification rule permits an attorney to represent interests
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in turn, promotes clients' trust in attorneys and ensures full and
free communication between client and counsel-a necessary pre29
requisite to adequate representation.
3. Relevance to Hutton
The Hutton court viewed the issue presented-whether counsel
who formerly represented multiple clients should be disqualified
from representing one against another in litigation related to the
former representation-as one of first impression. 30 Nevertheless,
the court was "persuaded by two considerations suggested in some
of the reported decisions."' 3 1 Citing two irrebuttable presumption
cases,3 2 the court stated: "[One] consideration which has persuaded this Court concerns the difficulties involved in determining
whether confidential information has been disclosed to the former
attorney." 33 Unlike Hutton, however, the cited cases involved the
possibility that counsel could misuse legally privileged communications. These cases reasoned merely that difficulties of proof
justified a conclusive presumption of receipt of confidences.3 4 In
Hutton, the former simultaneous representation of multiple clients
precluded any receipt of confidences by counsel. 3 Hutton, therefore, relied in part on cases holding that a client need not prove
receipt of confidences in concluding that "receipt of confidential
information is not a prerequisite to disqualification. ' 36 Unless
adverse to those of a former client if the former representation and current adverse litigation are not substantially related. See note 53 and text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
2'9See T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1953); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1975); 8 J. WIG-

MORE, supra note 10, § 2291, at 545-49 (policy underlying the attorney-client privilege);
Note, supra note 21, 54 YALE L.J. at 927.
30305 F. Supp. at 394-95.
31
1d. at 395.
32 Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d
920, 924-25 (2d Cir. 1954); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F.
Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), cited in E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. at
395 n.69. Courts and commentators commonly recognize T.C. Theatre as the source of the
substantial reltionship test that Hutton incorporated into its disqualification rule for cases
of prior simultaneous representation. See, e.g., Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d
706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518
F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975); Note, supra note 1, 52 CHi-KENT L. REv. at 527-30.
1 305 F. Supp. at 395.
3 See Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216
F.2d 920, 924 (2d Cir. 1954); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F.
Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
3
- See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
36 305 F. Supp. at 395.
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rationales other than preservation of confidences and secrets justified disqualification in Hutton, the court's holding amounts to
the creation of a conclusive presumption of receipt of secrets. That
is, since there were no privileged communications in Hutton,38 the
only justification for the court's holding lay in the need to prevent
actual or apparent misuse of client secrets that the court conclusively presumed to exist. Only if the policy of protecting client
secrets requires the same rules of disqualification as the policy of
protecting confidences does such a rule follow from the precedent
cited in Hutton. The policies differ, and so require different vehicles of implementation.3 9
Because privileged communications were their primary concern, courts developing the irrebuttable presumption of receipt of
37 An additional disqualification rationale might have justified the decision in Hutton:
enforcing the attorney's duty to disclose at the outset of simultaneous representation that
he may choose to represent one client against the other should a dispute between the
clients arise. See text accompanying notes 55-58 infra. The Hutton court, however, did not
analyze counsel's failure to disclose the legal implications of potential business conflicts as a
rationale for disqualification, but treated it instead as a factor negating counsel's waiver
defense. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text infra.
38 See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
3' Although the Hutton court never distinguished secrets from confidences, the court
did address the secrets rationale indirectly. The court criticized and refused to follow
Croce v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 2d 18, 68 P.2d 369 (1937), which equated the duty
owed a former client with the attorney-client evidentiary privilege: "What the court in Croce
failed to note is that the basis for the rule against representing conflicting interests is
broader than the basis for the attorney-client evidentiary privilege." E.F. Hutton & Co. v.
Brown, 305 F. Supp. at 394. The Hutton court's objection indirectly identified an attorney's duty not to misuse a client's secrets. The court, however, combined this objection with
its discussion of fiduciary duty (see text accompanying note 50 infra), and thus failed to
isolate the secrets rationale (see text accompanying note 51 infra).
Croce and a line of cases following it (see, e.g., Nichols v. Elkins, 2 Ariz. App. 272, 408
P.2d 34 (1965); Petty v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 2d 20, 253 P.2d 28 (1953)) involved
litigation between former joint venturers who had employed common counsel. Therefore,
the party moving to disqualify his former counsel could not claim violation of the
attorney-client privilege. See note 10 and accompanying text supra. These courts held that
since confidences of the former client were not involved as a matter of law, counsel could
not be disqualified. See Nichols v. Elkins, 2 Ariz. App. at 277, 408 P.2d at 34; Petty v.
Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 2d at 29-31, 253 P.2d at 33-34; Croce v. Superior Court, 21
Cal. App. 2d at 19-20, 68 P.2d at 369-70. Although the Croce line of cases mistakenly
limited the duty owed a former client to the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, the facts
of one case, Petty, suggest that counsel did not receive any client secrets. In Petty, counsel
merely drafted the agreements for two parties engaged in an oil well venture; he knew
nothing about the joint venture except the information the parties communicated to him.
116 Cal. App. 2d at 24-26, 253 P.2d at 30-32. Thus, the decision in Petty not to disqualify
counsel would have withstood scrutiny under the secrets rational. The court could have
satisfied any concern over misuse of secrets by requiring counsel to plead in good faith that
he had uncovered no secrets during the former representation. The moving party could
not in good faith have denied such an allegation.
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"confidential information" did not consider whether all sensitive
information required such protection.4 0 Two considerations justify
limiting the conclusive presumption to client confidences. First,
since confidences involve disclosures by the client to counsel, 41 even
the appearance of their improper use could impede full and free
communication with counsel. 42 Secrets, on the other hand, encompass sensitive information derived from sources other than the
client. 43 Thus, possible revelation of secrets poses no significant
threat to the policy of encouraging uninhibited communication between client and counsel. 4 4 Second, because secrets have independent sources, courts may be able to determine from the facts underlying the former representation that counsel did not come upon
client secrets. For example, counsel's former representation of the
party moving to disqualify may have involved no investigations or
other contacts relevant to the current litigation from which secret
information could have been obtained. 45 If the court finds that
receipt of secrets was highly unlikely, it can then attempt to remove
40 See,

e.g., Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1964); Consolidated Theatres,

Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 924 (2d Cir. 1954);
Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (dictum), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959); T.C.
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
" See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
42
See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
43
See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
44 A small category of direct communications between a client and his attorney may be
secrets" within the meaning of DR 4-101(A) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. See note 25 supra. The category consists of client disclosures that are unrelated to the
purpose for which the client retained counsel. In evaluating the Hutton rule, however, a
distinction between client secrets and confidences that is based on their different sources
remains viable. By excluding such extraneous disclosures, the attorney-client privilege embodies a judgment that their protection is not essential to the promotion of full and free
client communication. The Hutton rule manifests a similar judgment; the rule was not designed to protect extraneous disclosures. Since extraneous disclosures do not relate to the
subject matter of the former representation, they are beyond the intended scope of the
Hutton rule, which turns upon a substantial relationship between the subject matter of the
former representation and the issues of the present lawsuit. Protection of extraneous disclosures under the Hutton rule is merely incidental to a court's finding of such a substantial
relationship; absent a substantial relationship between the former and current representations, the Hutton rule's disqualification test does not protect the former client's extraneous
disclosures that are nevertheless "secrets." The Hutton rule thus seeks to protect only those
secrets that are substantially related to the subject matter of the former representation. By
definition, such secrets do not involve client communications. See note 25 and accompanying text supra. Therefore, possible revelation of secrets that the Hutton rule seeks to protect
poses no threat to the policy of promoting uninhibited communication between client and
counsel.
" See, e.g., Petty v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 2d 20, 253 P.2d 28 (1953), discussed
in note 39 supra.
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any remaining doubts through in camera inquiries of counsel.
Counsel's good faith assurances that he came upon no secrets during the former representation will often effectively eliminate the
secrets rationale for disqualification; judicial sanctions can help en46
sure counsel's good faith.
The distinction between confidences and secrets waxes critical
when courts extend the three-part disqualification rule to disqualified counsel's work product. Even if closed session inquiries cannot
satisfy a court that counsel acquired no secrets during the former
representation, a court can conclusively determine by in camera
inspection whether disqualified counsel's work product contains
47
secrets of the former client.
B.

FiduciaryDuties and the Appearance of Impropriety

The Hutton court summarized the second consideration underlying its decision: "If courts protect only a client's disclosures to his
attorney, and fail to safeguard the attorney-client relationship
itself-a relationship which must be one of trust and reliance-they
can only undermine the public's confidence in the legal system as a
means for adjudicating disputes. '48 The court's proposition suggests at least three rationales for disqualification. First, the statement reflects a basic premise discussed in the previous section:
Courts must protect a client's secrets as well as his disclosures to his
attorney. Second, the need to "safeguard the attorney-client relationship itself-a relationship which must be one of trust and
reliance-" ' 4 9 impliedly imposes on counsel a fiduciary duty to
former clients that encompasses more than the preservation of
confidences and secrets. Third, by avoiding even the appearance of
counsel's improper use of his client's disclosures, courts promote
full and free communication between client and counsel. This section examines the fiduciary-duty and appearance-of-impropriety
rationales.
1. Counsel's FiduciaryDuty to a Former Client
In reaching its decision to disqualify counsel, the Hutton court
posited a broad fiduciary duty for attorneys:

46Cf., e.g., Bardin v. Mondon, 298 F.2d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1961) (costs and damages);
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (disciplinary proceedings).
47 See note 77-78 and accompanying text infra.
48 305 F. Supp. at 395.
49

/d.
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The evidentiary privilege and the ethical duty not to disclose
confidences both arise from the need to encourage clients to
disclose all possibly pertinent information to their attorneys, and
both protect only the confidential information disclosed. The
duty not to represent conflicting interests, on the other hand, is
an outgrowth of the attorney-client relationship itself, which is
confidential, or fiduciary, in a broader sense. Not only do clients
at times disclose confidential information to their attorneys; they
also repose confidence in them. The privilege is bottomed only
on the first of these attributes, the conflicting-interests rules, on
both.
...If an attorney is permitted to defend a motion to disqualify by showing that he received no confidential information from
his former client, the client, a layman who has reposed confidence and trust in his attorney, will feel that the attorney has
50
escaped on a technicality.
The court stressed the need to protect not only the client's
"confidential information,"51 but also the "confidence" he "re10Id. at 394-95.

Although referred to in Hutton's discussion of fiduciary duty, the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility did not control because the Southern District of Texas
had not adopted it by rule of court. 305 F. Supp. at 377 n.7. Even where it does control by
statute or rule of court, the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility does not clearly define the attorney's obligation to former clients. See Note, supra note 1, 55 B.U. L. REV. at
63-65. Indeed, it does not address subsequent adverse representation except in the Canon
4 obligation to preserve client confidences and secrets. The conflict of interest provision
addresses only potential future conflicts:
A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to
involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted
under DR 5-105(C) [(representation of multiple clients permissible after "full disclosure" if clients consent)].
ABA CODE OF PROFEssrONAL RESPONSIBILrry DR 5-105(A) (1975).
The predecessor to DR 5-105(A), the third paragraph of ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics No. 6, also provided little guidance:
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers
or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the
client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
Relying in part on this language, the Hutton court concluded that a client's "repose of
confidence" in his counsel is conceptually broader than "confidential information." 305 F.
Supp. at 394. The drafters of Canon 6 most probably did not intend "confidence . . .
reposed" to mean more than client confidences and secrets in the case of subsequent representation. Admittedly, the Canon 6 duty not to represent conflicting interests is broader
than the duty to preserve confidences and secrets in the context of simultaneous representation of multiple clients because independence of professional judgment is then at stake.
This consideration is absent, however, in the case of subsequent adverse representation.
" For a discussion of the confusion arising from use of the imprecise term "confiden-
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poses" in his attorney. Unfortunately, the court did not indicate
whether the latter "confidence" referred merely to client secrets or
to some broader fiduciary notion. The quoted section could therefore imply an attorney's fiduciary duty never to represent interests
adverse to those of a former client, even if the attorney received
neither confidences nor secrets. Such a reading of the attorney's
duty misled the district court in First Wisconsin. The court quoted
Hutton and concluded:
[A]lthough all three elements are essential to a determination that
counsel should be disqualified, subsequent adverse representation most directly violates the confidence that the former client
placed in his counsel ....

What greater violation of that confi-

dence could there be than for that attorney in a subsequent court
proceeding to actively represent interests opposed to those of his
52
former client?

This conclusion ignores the implications of the accepted doctrine
that adverse representation is clearly permissible if the issues of the
former and subsequent representations are not substantially related.5 3 Permitting counsel to defend on a motion to disqualify by
showing he received neither confidences nor secrets looks no more
like "escap[ing] on a technicality" than allowing counsel to show
that the complex issues of the former and current representations
are not substantially related. Yet, the latter showing clearly defeats
a motion to disqualify. Given the substantial similarity of proving
no relation of issues and proving no risk of misuse of secrets despite relation, the district court's fiduciary duty rationale collapses
where confidences and secrets do not exist. The lawyer's duty of
tial information," see notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
52 74

F.R.D. at 626-27 (work product order). The Seventh Circuit panel did not deal

explicitly with fiduciary duty as a rationale for disqualification. The panel cited ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility Canon 4 ("A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and
Secrets of a Client") and Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety") as the controlling principles for both the disqualification and the
work product issues. 571 F.2d at 396. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit panel did approve
of the district court's "scholarly opinion" (id. at 396) and allude to that court's fiduciary duty
analysis: "Without citing [the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility], the district court
in the present case followed [its] guidelines in determining that the sanctity of a former attorney-client relationship . . . would be threatened if the use of predisqualification work
product by substitute counsel were permitted" (id. at 396 n.12).
53 A former client will succeed on a motion to disqualify only if the subject matter of
the adverse representation is substantially related to the subject of the former one. See
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754-57 (2d Cir.
1975); American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir. 1971); Big
Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Superior Court, 269 Cal. App. 2d 919, 926-27, 75 Cal. Rptr. 580,
585 (1969).
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undivided loyalty to a client, often characterized as fiduciary, ends
when the professional relationship terminates.5 4 The fiduciary duty
language of Hutton and the district court in First Wisconsin only
muddies the waters; it merely reflects a lawyer's duty to preserve a
former client's secrets as well as his confidences.
Attorneys do owe clients a duty of disclosure, however, that
can properly be characterized as fiduciary. Both Hutton and the
trial court in First Wisconsin stressed counsel's failure to disclose the
legal implications of potential conflicts of interest:
"As heretofore indicated, it was the duty of counsel to call to
the attention of both [clients] the existence and legal implications
of any potential conflict of interest. Receipt of such advice would
be the bare minimum predicatefor a waiver by [the former client] of

his right to object to a subsequent adverse representation."...
It is the finding of this Court that one of the legal implications of the potential conflicts was the possibility that [counsel]
would withdraw from its representation of the Trust [one of four
multiple clients] and choose to continue representing the defendants [the remaining clients] in litigation with the Trust. [Counsel] failed to disclose this possibility to the Trust at the time of its
establishment. In order for the Trust to have waived its objection
to [counsel's] representation of the defendants, it had to have
55
been made aware of this possibility.

Although the courts treated the problem as a waiver issue, 5 6 an
attorney's failure to disclose the legal implications of potential business conflicts among multiple clients taints the subsequent adverse
representation with breach of trust. An attorney should disclose at
the outset of simultaneous representation the possibility that he
may choose to continue representing some clients against the
others in the event of a client dispute. 57 As a rationale distinct from
14 For discussion of the distinctions between the duties a lawyer owes current clients
and those he owes former clients, see note 50 supra.
55 First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 422 F. Supp. at 496 (emphasis in
original) (disqualification order) (quoting E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. at
400).
56 Counsel in First Wisconsin claimed to have fulfilled their professional obligation by
disclosing potential conflicts of interest between the multiple clients. 422 F. Supp. at 496
(disqualification order). Counsel argued further that the trust waived its right to object to
the subsequent adverse representation by failing to object when counsel informed the trust
of potential business conflicts. Id. Similarly, counsel in Hutton argued that movant Brown,
by consenting to the simultaneous representation, waived his right to object to counsel's
continued representation of E.F. Hutton & Co. 305 F. Supp. at 400.
57 If an attorney knows with reasonable certainty at the outset of simultaneous representation which of the multiple clients he would choose to continue representing if a
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protecting confidences and secrets, the policy of deterring attorneys from breaching client trust warrants disqualifying lawyers who
fail to disclose the legal implications of potential conflicts. This
rationale does not, however, justify punishing the client of disqualified counsel by denying the client access, through substitute coun5 8
sel, to disqualified counsel's work product.
2. Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety
Hutton's treatment of appearance of impropriety as an independent rationale for attorney disqualification stood on the same
ground as its fiduciary duty analysis and was similarly flawed. The
court reasoned that counsel's appearance against their former client
will always "appear unseemly, regardless of the amount of representation they afforded him, or the secrecy of their discussions
and advice to him at the time."5 9 Again, the court ignored the
implications of the substantial relationship requirement of its own
three-part disqualification rule: Attorneys can represent interests
adverse to those of a former client if the former and current representations are not substantially related.6 0 Such representation
cannot appear improper per se. Under the Hutton rule, apparent
impropriety justifies disqualification only when courts cannot
adequately ensure, in a manner credible to laymen, that counsel
received no confidences or secrets during the former representation.61 Moreover, some policies underlying the "appearance" rule
dispute arose, he should probably disclose his intended allegiance. The trial court in First
Wisconsin did not indicate whether counsel should have disclosed his particular intended
allegiance or merely the general possibility of subsequent adverse representation to all. See
text accompanying note 55 supra.
58 See text accompanying note 83 infra.
59305 F. Supp. at 399.
60 See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
"I Some might argue that proving no substantial relationship of issues in the former
and current representations precludes an appearance of impropriety in the eyes of the
layman in a way that proving counsel received no confidences or secrets does not. The
argument has merit only if courts cloud the concepts of confidences and secrets with technical definitions that laymen cannot understand. Courts can, however, explain these concepts in terms laymen can understand: If an attorney possesses no confidences or secrets of
his former client, he enjoys no advantage over any other lawyer in a later representation
against that former client. Admittedly, a lawyer might obtain psychological or intangible
knowledge about a client over the course of representation. But neither the substantial
relationship test nor the rule against misusing a client's confidences or secrets can eliminate
this problem. Only an absolute ban against opposing a former client would remove the
possibility of "psychological advantage."
Courts should recognize preservation of confidences and preservation of secrets as the
rationales underlying the substantial relationship test for disqualification. Once the courts
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for confidences do not pertain to secrets. Avoiding even the appearance of improper use of confidences furthers the policy of
ensuring full and free communication between client and counsel. 62 This rationale does not apply to secrets because secrets are

obtained from sources other than the client.6 3 Thus, the "appearance" rationale lacks force under the Hutton rule in cases of simultaneous representation where the former attorney could not, by
64
definition, have received any client confidences.
To summarize, the Hutton rule evolved from cases and doctrines addressing the problem of preserving confidences of former
clients. Other policies-preventing misuse of secrets, enforcing
fiduciary duties and avoiding the appearance of improprietyjustify attorney disqualification in some, but not all cases. In cases
of former simultaneous representation, where the confidences
rationale is inapplicable, the remaining policies do not justify unthinking application of the Hutton disqualification rule. Courts
should therefore consider the factors influencing the Hutton rule
and the separate rationales for disqualification. Proper disposition
of issues arising subsequent to disqualification particularly requires
such consideration. The next section applies the proposed analysis
to an issue generated by disqualification of counsel in First Wisconsin: access to disqualified counsel's work product.
II
ATTORNEY DISQUALIFICATION AND ACCESS BY SUBSTITUTE
COUNSEL TO WORK PRODUCT: SEPARATING THE ISSUES

In First Wisconsin, defendant First Wisconsin Corporation orig-

inally sponsored the plaintiff real estate investment trust. Defenexplain these rationales in the context of representation against a former client, the legal
system can determine issue by issue how best to avoid an unseemly appearance that an
attorney misused client confidences or secrets.

Clarification of the underlying rationales of the substantial relationship test is also
necessary for proper analysis of issues arising subsequent to disqualification. For example,
the predisqualification legal work that substitute counsel sought in First Wisconsin involved
"a routine, tedious analysis of loan files" (571 F.2d at 400 (dissenting opinion, Pell, J.)) that
substitute counsel or any lawyer could easily reproduce (id.). See note 77 infra. Requiring
substitute counsel to repeat such work merely imposes a financial burden on the client of
disqualified counsel. See note 79 and accompanying text infra. The Seventh Circuit panel
nevertheless ruled that attorney disqualification automatically precludes use of any of disqualified counsel's work product. 571 F.2d at 397-99.
62 See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
11 See notes 25 & 44 and accompanying text supra.
64 See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
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dant First Wisconsin Mortgage Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the corporation, advised the trust on its investments. The
three parties utilized common counsel for their joint business venture. A dispute arose over the underwriting and administration of
66
particular loans 65 and the trust retained independent counsel.
Because the parties were joint venturers, no information they dis67
closed to common counsel could be confidential as among them.
Further, it appears that counsel did not obtain any secrets during
the simultaneous representation. 68 Nevertheless, the trial court in69
voked the Hutton rule and disqualified counsel.
The plaintiff did not move to disqualify until well into the
dispute.7 0 Consequently, defendant's counsel prepared a substantial work product prior to the court's disqualification order.7 ' Relying on Hutton's disqualification reasoning, the district court denied
substitute counsel's request for access to this work product.7 2 The
6-422 F. Supp. at 494 (disqualification order).
66

/d.

67 See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
68

See 571 F.2d at 400 (dissenting opinion, Pell, J.).
69422 F. Supp. at 496 (disqualification order).
70 The dispute between the trust and the defendants arose in February 1974. The
trust, on the suggestion of general counsel (counsel disqualified in the ensuing litigation),
retained independent counsel. Thereafter the trust and the defendants negotiated at arms
length, although counsel for defendants did not withdraw as general counsel for the trust
until September 1974. The trust did not indicate that it would object to its former counsel's
continued representation of defendants until spring of 1975. 422 F. Supp. at 494-95 (disqualification order). The primary reason for delay was the parties' expectation that the
dispute would end short of litigation.
Because a disqualification motion is an equitable proceeding, the court has discretion
to deny the motion if a party does not move to disqualify until several years into the
litigation. See Milone v. English, 306 F.2d 814, 818 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Marco v. Dulles,
169 F. Supp. 622, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). But counsel may build up an expensive work
product in a much shorter time. See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
71 See Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 15, First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis.
Corp., 571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978). Even after the plaintiff moved to disqualify, defendants' counsel did not act unreasonably in continuing to generate work product. Counsel
and defendants believed that the issues of the former representation of the trust were not
substantially related to the subject matter of the current litigation. See Defendants' Reply
Brief Opposing Motion to Disqualify at 1-5, First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp.,
No. 77-1786 (7th Cir. Jan. 30, 1978). Given the prevailing substantial-relationship-of-issues
requirement and the complexity of issues involved in many cases, counsel often cannot
predict whether a court will grant the motion to disqualify. Barring use of predisqualification work product therefore creates a significant risk that clients will suffer severe economic hardship. See text accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
72 74 F.R.D. at 627-28 (work product order) (quoting E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305
F. Supp. at 394). The Seventh Circuit panel relied indirectly on Hutton's disqualification
reasoning by paraphrasing with approval the "scholarly opinion" of the district court. 571
F.2d at 396. The panel agreed with the court below that the work product issue "should be
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district court deemed the content of the work product irrelevant:
To attempt to divorce [former counsel's] work product from its
representation of the defendants would be an absurd position
Although the court in Hutton was referring to a proffered
defense to disqualification, this Court feels that [Hutton's] reasoning applies
equally to the question posed by the [work product]
73
motion.
The court skipped several logical steps. In joint venture situations,
courts can adequately protect client secrets-the only applicable
74
concern-without a per se rule denying access to work product.
A. Breach of FiduciaryDuty and Appearance of Impropriety
Of the four rationales underlying disqualification, only two
seek to protect the former client against potential harm from the
adverse representation: preservation of confidences and preservation of secrets. The others--enforcing fiduciary duty and avoiding
the appearance of impropriety-seek instead to punish counsel or
to further some public interest. At the outset of simultaneous representation, an attorney should disclose to his multiple clients that,
should a dispute arise, he may choose to represent one against the
other. If he fails to do so and subsequently undertakes adverse
representation, the attorney commits a breach of trust. 75 The
threat of disqualification for this breach of trust encourages attorneys to fully disclose the legal implications of potential conflicts of
interest. Punishing the client by denying him access to disqualified
counsel's work product, however, furthers no legitimate interest
resolved in accordance with the same principles as applied in the original disqualification
decision." Id. at 397. By limiting its review of the district court's work product order to a
determination of whether that court had abused its discretion, the panel allowed the district court considerable leeway in applying ethical principles. Id. at 399.
The parties in First Wisconsin raised no factual issues concerning the disputed work
product. 74 F.R.D. at 627 (work product order). Recent decisions have seriously questioned
the propriety of the abuse-of-discretion standard of review in attorney disqualification cases
where only legal questions are at issue. For example, the Fifth Circuit concluded that "[ifn
disqualification cases . . . , where the facts are not in dispute, District Courts enjoy no
particular functional advantage over appellate courts in their formulation and application
of ethical norms." Woods v. Covington City Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976).
Accord, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 571 F.2d 1197, 1200 (4th Cir. 1978).
73 74 F.R.D. at 627 (work product order).
7'The Seventh Circuit, in its en banc decision, rejected the per se approach in favor of
a flexible rule.
7'See text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
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unless the work product contains confidences or secrets of the
former client. The client should not suffer unnecessarily for his attorney's breach of fiduciary duty.
When confidences of the former client are not at issue, only
potential misuse of client secrets can taint adverse representation
with an appearance of impropriety. Unlike apparent misuse of
client confidences, the "appearance" rationale lacks independent
justificatory force when applied to secrets.7 6 Thus, in cases of
former simultaneous representation, if a court determines that disqualified counsel's work product contains no secrets of the former
client, it cannot logically apply the "appearance" rationale.
B.

Preservationof Secrets
A court considering a former client's motion to disqualify cannot always ensure that counsel received no secrets while representing his former client. The court, however, can remove any uncertainty about work product 7 7 by inspecting in camera the documents
sought by substitute counsel. 78 Such inspection is justified because
See text accompanying notes 59-64 supra.
77 Substitute counsel in First Wisconsin used the term "work product" to describe the
legal documents they sought from disqualified counsel. See 571 F.2d at 392. The Seventh
Circuit panel read the term more broadly:
There is apparently no dispute that defendants seek the "work product" of
prior counsel as that term is commonly used. That is, defendants seek
[m'he information [prior counsel] has assembled and the mental impressions,
the legal theories and strategies that he has pursued or adopted as derived
from interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, legal and
factual research, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and other tangible or
intangible means.
State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 589, 150 N.W.2d 387, 404
(1967); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 ... (1947).
571 F.2d at 396 n.9. Applying this all-inclusive definition, the Seventh Circuit panel concluded that disqualification automatically precludes any use of disqualified counsel's "work
product". Id. at 396-99. The legal work that substitute counsel sought in First Wisconsin,
however, involved merely "a routine, tedious analysis of loan files relating to some 300
complex transactions ....
which any competent lawyer by spending the substantial time
which would be required could accomplish just as well as did [disqualified counsel]." Id. at
400 (dissenting opinion, Pell, J.). The dissent went on to remark that "[t]he only apparent
advantage I have been able to see that will accrue to the [former client] is that of harassment of an opponent in litigation." Id. Thus, the First Wisconsin panel majority failed to
examine the precise nature of the requested legal work once it decided that the documents
fell within its broad definition of work product.
78 In Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977), the Eighth
Circuit confronted a question of first impression: "Does a lawyer's representation of A,
codefendant with B in a prior suit, disqualify the lawyer as representative of C against B in
a subsequent related suit." Id. at 606. The district court had utilized in camera inspection to
ensure that counsel had not received confidences or secrets of movants through movants'
76
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the client will often suffer evere economic hardship if the court
forces substitute counsel to repeat the work that produced the requested documents.7 9 In First Wisconsin, for example, a team of
fifteen lawyers had worked for more than a year prior to their
disqualification to prepare the requested written materials.80 Two
factors create a substantial likelihood that work product prepared
prior to disqualification will be extensive. First, formal litigation
often does not begin until well into a dispute. Thus, counsel
amasses a substantial work product before his former client is in a
position to move for disqualification.' Second, given the Hutton
rule's substantial relationship requirement and the complexity of
issues involved in many cases, counsel cannot always anticipate disqualification. Even after a motion to disqualify, therefore, work
often continues because counsel believes in good faith that no substantial relationship between the two representations exists.8 2 Finally, although the financial loss to clients justifies imposing the
burden of inspection on courts, courts may in some cases avoid this
burden by relying on disqualified counsel's good faith assurances
83
that his work product contains no secrets.

attorneys in the former suit. Id. at 605. The Eighth Circuit found no abuse of discretion.
Id. at 610. Cf. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1104 (5th Cir. 1970) (dictum)
(courts can use in camera inspection to preserve confidentiality in trade secret cases), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). The Seventh Circuit en banc majority seemed receptive to in
camera inspection of predisqualification work product. See No. 77-1786, slip op. at 9 n.6
(7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1978).
79 Clients stand little chance of recovering, from disqualified counsel, fees paid for lost
work product. Neither tort nor contract law provides a sound basis for recovery. Because
of the great difficulties attorneys face in predicting whether a court will ultimately find the
former and current representation substantially related, disqualification does not necessarily imply negligence on the part of counsel in continuing representation. Counsel can
further eliminate any grounds for a negligence action by disclosing the risk of disqualification to the multiple clients and requiring them to decide whether to obtain new counsel
before counsel does substantial work. Assuming such disclosure precludes a finding of fault
on the part of counsel, the judicial disqualification order constitutes an impossibility defense that will excuse counsel from further performance of the employment agreement.
See 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1939 (rev. ed. S. Williston & G. Thompson 1938). If the
client has already paid for legal work performed, he must bear the loss which arises when
counsel cannot complete performance. Id. Attorneys may provide in the employment
agreement that once counsel has disclosed the possibility of disqualification, the client bears
the risk of lost work product.
1o 571 F.2d at 392.
81 For a discussion of this problem as it arose in First Wisconsin see note 70 supra.
82

83

See note 71 supra.

See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra. Alternatively, a court might order a master

to inspect, in camera, the requested documents and assess the cost to the party seeking
access to the work product.
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CONCLUSION

Attorneys can often represent interests adverse to those of a
former client without breaching any ethical duties. Unfortunately,
the prevailing disqualification rule loses sight of the duties an attorney owes a former client. Courts seeking to prevent misuse of a
former client's confidences developed a pragmatic disqualification
test substituting relationship of issues for inquiry into whether
counsel actually received confidences: If the subject matter of counsel's former representation and the issues in the current litigation
are substantially related, the court will disqualify counsel without
further inquiry. E.F. Hutton & Co. v: Brown incorporated this test
into its disqualification rule, but applied the rule to a situationformer simultaneous representation-that precluded by definition
receipt of confidences. Hutton's adoption of the substantial relationship test for such cases obscures the rationales for attorney disqualification. Policies other than preventing misuse of client confidences-preventing misuse of secrets, avoiding the appearance of
impropriety, and enforcing fiduciary duties-justify attorney disqualification in some, but not all cases in which the Hutton rule
requires disqualification. Regrettably, courts have applied the Hutton rule to disqualification cases without examining the rule's separate underlying rationales. Moreover, courts failing to isolate these
rationales have distended the rule to deny automatically access to
all predisqualification work product. In the context of former simultaneous representation, only the need to preserve secrets of the
former client bears on the work product issue. Courts can ensure
that disqualified counsel's work product contains no secrets of the
former client by inspecting in camera the requested documents. The
severe financial hardship the current client of disqualified counsel
may suffer from loss of work product outweighs any burden in
camera inspection imposes on the court.
Thomas C. Newman

